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Post-Caremark Implications for Health Care
Organization Boards of Directors
Kimberly D. Baker & Arissa M. Peterson1
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the government has devoted substantial resources to
investigate and prosecute health care fraud and abuse. The increase in
governmental prosecutorial activity in the health care industry can be traced
to two significant trends: (1) concern over waste, fraud, and abuse as one of
the Department of Justice’s top priorities, and (2) increased awareness of
the economic benefits of qui tam (whistleblower) suits. In the last several
years, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) have encouraged the health care
community to prevent and reduce fraud and abuse in federal health care
programs by implementing an effective compliance program. In 1996, a
Delaware Chancery Court held in In re Caremark Int’l Inc., Derivative
Litigation that the failure of a corporate director to make a good faith
attempt at instituting an effective compliance program may, in some
situations, constitute a breach of a director’s fiduciary obligations.2 The
decision in Caremark changed the landscape of individual liability for
boards of directors by making it easier for members of boards of directors to
be held liable.3 Because of this decision and increased scrutiny by the
government, health care organizations should implement and carry out
effective corporate-compliance programs. The risk of personal liability for
directors who fail to oversee compliance has risen as fiduciary doctrines
have been reinforced.
This article will focus on the Caremark decision and a director’s duty to
oversee compliance with federal and state laws and regulations. First, the
article will examine a board of director’s liability under the theory of
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fiduciary duties. Next, the article will discuss Caremark and the impact of
its holding, as well as the additional layer of scrutiny imposed by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that went into effect in 2002. Finally, this article will
provide guidelines for implementing a corporate-compliance program that
will satisfy Caremark. Directors face personal liability during this time of
enhanced awareness of corporate responsibility. Accordingly, it is essential
that a health care organization be familiar with Caremark and its
implications for compliance, otherwise organizations may face harsh civil
and criminal penalties.4 The Caremark decision and its progeny, as well as
the recent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act governing corporate conduct,
make the implementation and adherence to a corporate-compliance program
critical to the success of health care organizations.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Fiduciary Duty Overview
Health care organizations are subject to substantial state and federal
regulatory requirements. The board of directors of a health care
organization is, in broad terms, responsible for the conduct of the
organization’s business. Typically, in a larger corporation, the day-to-day
management responsibilities are delegated to the executives and other
senior staff. However, this delegation does not release the directors from
responsibility to oversee the actions of senior management. All corporate
boards are accountable to certain groups. In publicly owned corporations,
the directors are accountable to the individual shareholders. A director may
be found personally liable for failing to carry out his or her fiduciary duties.
The usual mechanism for establishing personal liability is through a
derivative suit, brought by shareholders or members on behalf of the
corporation against the directors and officers. 5
The role of a director is primarily one of monitoring—to review financial
information and to oversee the organization’s compliance with state and
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federal laws and regulations. In order to carry out their duties, the directors
must have a sufficient understanding of the nature of the business, as well
as the management and information structures in place to determine if each
structure is adequate to perform its respective role. Directors of both forprofit and nonprofit health care organizations are subject to the duty of care
in the oversight of the business, including business performance and
compliance with applicable laws and regulations. According to the OIG,
the duty of care requires that a director make decisions (1) in “good faith,”
(2) with that level of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise
in like circumstances, and (3) in a manner that he or she reasonably believes
is in the best interest of the corporation.6 Board members are not generally
held liable for an organizational decision if it is consistent with the duty of
care.7
Directors may face potential liability for a breach of the duty of care for
failing to exercise appropriate attention in two distinct contexts. First,
liability may follow from a board decision that results in a loss because that
board decision was ill advised or negligent.8 Second, liability to the
corporation for a loss may arise from an unconsidered failure of the board to
act in circumstances where due attention would have prevented the loss
(i.e., the duty to monitor).9 Liability usually stems from the business
judgment rule, which states that the decision must be the product of a
process that was either deliberately considered in good faith or was
otherwise rational.10 Directors may be exempt from liability under the
business judgment rule if the decisions were made in good faith, the director
was disinterested and reasonably informed under the circumstances, and the
director rationally believed the decision was in the best interest of the
corporation.11
This article will focus on a board of director’s duty of care in monitoring
corporate operations and ensuring compliance with state and federal laws
and regulations. While a board’s decision will normally be subject to the
business judgment rule, the changing landscape of corporate responsibility
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and compliance has altered the meaning of “duty of care” to allow for the
personal liability of directors who fail to monitor corporate activities to
minimize and respond to legal liability.
B. Caremark and Its Progeny: Expanded Liability for Health Care Boards
of Directors
In 1996, the Delaware Chancery Court expanded personal liability for
members of a board of directors by recognizing that a director’s failure to
implement and carry out an effective corporate-compliance program may, in
some circumstances, render a director liable.12 The Caremark decision
arose from a proposed settlement of a consolidated derivative action on
behalf of Caremark International, Inc. (Caremark) involving claims against
Caremark’s board of directors for violations of federal and state laws.
Caremark is a Delaware corporation that was formed in 1992 with its
headquarters in Illinois.13 The corporation was a spin-off of Baxter
International, Inc., and became a publicly held company listed on the New
York Stock Exchange.14 For the relevant time period relating to the lawsuit,
Caremark provided both patient care and managed care services as its main
health care business.15 During the relevant time period, Caremark had
7,000 employees and ninety branch operations.16 The majority of
Caremark’s revenues were derived from the patient care services, which
involved alternative site health care services, including infusion therapy,
growth hormone therapy, HIV/AIDS-related treatments and hemophilia
therapy.17 Caremark’s managed care services included prescription drug
programs and multi-specialty group practices.18 Like many health care
organizations, a substantial part of Caremark’s revenues were derived from
third-party payments, insurers, and Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement
programs.19
The Caremark lawsuit involved claims that the members of the Caremark
Board of Directors (the Board) breached their duty of care to the
corporation. The plaintiffs alleged that the board was negligent when it
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failed to adequately address violations of federal and state laws and
regulations that were allegedly committed by Caremark employees. The
allegations included violations of the Anti-Referral Payments Law (ARPL)
(unlawful “kickbacks”); unlawful billing practices, including excessive and
medically unnecessary treatments for patients, potentially improper waivers
of patient co-payment obligations; and, inadequate records maintained at
Caremark pharmacies.20 As a result of the alleged violations, Caremark was
subject to an extensive four-year investigation by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice,
which resulted in an indictment for multiple felonies.21 Caremark entered
into a number of agreements, including a plea agreement in which it
pleaded guilty to a single felony of mail fraud and agreed to pay civil and
criminal fines.22 Later, Caremark agreed to pay reimbursements to various
public and private parties totaling approximately $250 million.23
In response to the governmental investigation, the Board took several
steps consistent with an effort to assure compliance with company policies
concerning the ARPL.24
Throughout the period of governmental
investigations, Caremark had an internal audit plan designed to assure
compliance with business and ethics policies.25 In addition, Caremark took
additional steps aimed at increasing management supervision, including
adopting new policies for local branch managers to certify compliance with
the ethics program.26
The Caremark court explained that to establish director liability for
breaching the duty to exercise appropriate attention to potentially illegal
corporate activities was “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation
law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”27 Without a
conflict of interest or facts demonstrating suspect motivation, it is difficult
to charge directors with responsibility for corporate losses for an alleged
breach of care.28 Director liability under this theory may arise from (1) a
board decision that resulted in a loss because the decision was ill-advised,
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or (2) “an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which
due attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss.”29
Board member inattention can be a basis for director liability, even
though most corporate decisions are not subject to director attention.30 “[A]
director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system, which the [b]oard concludes is
adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in
theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance
with applicable legal standards.”31 Ordinary business decisions made by
officers and employees deeper in the corporation can significantly injure the
corporation and make it subject to criminal sanctions.32
The level of detail needed for an information system is a matter of
business judgment. The Caremark decision set a high standard that, in
some circumstances, could result in liability for seemingly minor actions.
Under the Caremark standard, directors may be held personally liable for
losses caused by failing to maintain reasonable information and reporting
systems, or failing to monitor and improve suspect practices that have been
brought to the board’s attention.
[I]t is important that the board exercise a good faith judgment that
the corporation’s information and reporting system is in concept
and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate
information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a
matter of ordinary operations, so that it may satisfy its
responsibility.33
While unconsidered inaction, in theory, can render a director liable, no
Caremark directors were found personally liable. Caremark enhanced a
director’s risk of liability by opening the door to increased scrutiny and
reinforcement of the duty to monitor.
Subsequent cases opened the door to personal liability for directors even
further. In 2001, the Sixth Circuit expanded Caremark by eliminating the
need for directors to act intentionally to harm the corporation.34 McCall v.
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Scott involved a consolidated stockholder derivative action brought against
current and former directors of Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, the
owner and operator of nearly half of all the for-profit hospitals in the United
States.35 The complaint alleged that the Columbia board knew of senior
management efforts to devise schemes to improperly increase revenue and
profits and perpetuate a management philosophy that provided strong
incentives for employees to commit fraud.36 The McCall court concluded
that the decision in Caremark does not require a director to have
intentionally acted to harm the corporation.37 The court reviewed the
factual allegations only for the purpose of examining the sufficiency of the
pleadings with respect to demand futility.38 The complaint cited significant
factors indicating that the board must have been aware of the fraud,
including (1) audit discrepancies between cost reports submitted to the
government and secret reserve reports, (2) improper acquisition practices in
which at least one of the directors personally was involved, (3) a qui tam
action alleging a widespread strategy to engage in violations of federal law,
and (4) an extensive criminal investigation that included raids on thirty-five
Columbia facilities in six different states.39 These particularized facts were
sufficient to present a substantial likelihood of liability on the part of at least
five of Columbia’s directors.40
A significant factor in the court’s conclusion was the prior experience of
a number of the defendant directors.41 Given the defendants’ prior
experience in business and/or as board members, the court in McCall was
persuaded that the failure to react to the criminal investigation and other
“red flags” created a strong inference of intentional or reckless disregard.42
Thus,
when director liability is predicated upon ignorance of liabilitycreating activities, “only a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to
assure a reasonable information reporting system exists—will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to
liability.”43
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In 2002, the Seventh Circuit followed suit with McCall and again
expanded personal liability for directors.44 In Re Abbott Laboratories
Derivative Shareholders Litigation involved a shareholder derivative suit
against Abbott’s board of directors. The plaintiffs alleged that the directors
breached their fiduciary duties created in a consent decree, resulting in harm
to the corporation. The harm included paying a $100 million civil fine to
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), withdrawing 125 types of
medical diagnostic test kits from the U.S. market, destroying certain
inventory, and making a number of corrective changes in its manufacturing
procedures after six years of federal violations.45 Plaintiffs maintained that
the directors were aware of the six-year history of noncompliance problems
with the FDA and that they had a duty to take necessary action to correct
these problems.46 During a six-year period, the FDA conducted thirteen
separate inspections of Abbott’s facilities.47 The FDA sent four formal
certified warning letters to Abbott, cautioning that failure to correct certain
deviations could result in severe regulatory action.48 Because information
concerning the violations had been made known to the general public early
in the six-year period, the plaintiffs maintained that the directors had a duty
under rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to comply with “comprehensive government regulations.”49
The court found that the directors’ actions fell outside the protection of
the business judgment rule by examining the magnitude and duration of the
alleged wrongful conduct.50 The court concluded that unlike the board
members in Caremark, the board members in Abbot were aware of the
problems.51 The court noted that “[t]he facts in Abbott do not support the
conclusion that the directors were ‘blamelessly unaware of the conduct
leading to the corporate liability.’”52 Accordingly, the court held that the
plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded allegations of a breach of the duty of good
faith that, if true, led one to reasonably conclude that the directors’ actions
fell outside the protection of the business judgment rule.53
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The Caremark holding did not make any monumental changes to
corporate law. Yet, the Caremark court specifically addressed the issue of
corporate directors’ individual liability for failing to adequately monitor a
corporation’s activities. While the Caremark directors were not found to
have breached the duty of care by failing to monitor the organization’s
activities, the Caremark decision has set a demanding standard that can be
imposed on boards of directors of health care organizations. The McCall
and Abbott decisions demonstrate that something less than intentional
conduct may result in personal liability. First and foremost, “the magnitude
and duration of the alleged wrongdoing is relevant in determining whether
the failure of the directors to act constitutes a lack of good faith.”54 Specific
factors gleaned from Caremark, McCall, and Abbott may include
experience on the board and prior board experience, knowledge of ongoing
government or SEC investigations, and the public’s general knowledge of
wrongdoing or non-compliance, all of which may be indicative of a board’s
“unconsidered inaction” under the Caremark standard.55
C. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In addition to Caremark and decisions following, an additional layer of
scrutiny has been added in light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA), which
was signed into law on July 30, 2002.56 The SOA was intended to promote
disclosure of corporate wrongdoing. Publicly held companies and those
companies required to file reports under the Securities and Exchange Act
section 15(d) must be attentive to the prohibitions under section 806 of the
SOA and the civil remedial measures afforded to whistleblowers who report
a reasonable belief of misconduct.57 The act provides for expansive civil
sanctions and establishes timelines and burdens of proof that are markedly
different from whistleblower claims in most other employment settings.
Given its breadth of making individuals potentially liable and its harsh
fines and/or imprisonment for criminal misconduct, the SOA surpasses all
other similar acts. Section 806 of the SOA, the civil provisions, affords
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federal protection for whistleblowers who work for a company with a class
of securities registered under section 12 of the Security Exchange Act of
1934 (SEA) (15 U.S.C. § 781) or those who work for a company that is
required to file reports under section 15(d) of the SEA (15 U.S.C. §
780(d)).58 Section 806 amends 18 U.S.C. by adding section 1514A, which
prohibits retaliatory conduct toward anyone who participates in the lawful
reporting of violations concerning financially fraudulent company
activities.59
In order to receive protection under this statute, the
whistleblower must reasonably believe that the activities constitute a
violation of (1) federal securities law, (2) SEC rules or regulations, or (3)
other federal law provisions that relate to shareholder fraud.60
The three key elements necessary to receive protection under the act are
reporting, individual liability, and criminal liability. To warrant protection
under the SOA, the alleged violations must be reported to a law
enforcement officer or to someone with supervisory authority or authority
to investigate, discover, or correct the violations.61 Section 806 provides
protection for employees who report a reasonable belief of the occurrence
of a civil violation of sections 1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348 of Title 18 of the
U.S. Code.62 Section 1107 provides criminal penalties for any individual
who knowingly, and with the intent to retaliate, takes harmful action against
an employee who provides law enforcement with truthful information about
a commission or potential commission of any federal offense.63 The
criminal penalties of section 1107 are not exclusive to those sections of
Title 18 of the U.S. Code to which section 806 pertains. Under section
1107, criminal liability attaches to both private and public companies and
nonprofit organizations.64
Health care organizations need to be aware of the SOA and the penalty
scheme imposed for violations. This act provides for whistleblower and
retaliation protection as well as individual liability for violations. In
implementing corporate-compliance programs, organizations need to
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understand the SOA and its applicability to the organization, as well as
create compliance programs and policies tailored to meet its requirements.
D. Suggestions for Implementing Effective Compliance Programs
In evaluating the fiduciary duties of the board of directors, board
members need to be especially diligent about acting in good faith to assure
that adequate corporate information and reporting systems exist.
Implementing an effective compliance program is critical for insulating
health care organizations from harsh criminal and civil sanctions and
exclusion from federal programs. An effective compliance program extends
through many layers of the organization. Caremark is particularly
instructive in reinforcing the need for a tailored compliance program
specific to the health care organization. While Caremark and other cases
have established the directors’ duty to oversee compliance programs, none
provide a specific methodology to structure such a program.
On April 2, 2003, the OIG in collaboration with the American Health
Lawyers Association (AHLA) published Corporate Responsibility and
Corporate Compliance: A Resource for Health Care Boards of Directors
(hereinafter referred to as the “OIG Guidance”).65 While this guidance is a
good starting point for board members, it is not a “one size fits all” exacting
standard.66 The purpose of the guidance is to help directors of both profit
and nonprofit health care organizations perform organizational oversight
and ask probing questions about compliance.67 In the wake of several
accounting scandals such as Enron and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the guidance serves as a reminder of the obligations of corporate
directors and of the increased attention by government regulators on health
care organizations’ corporate compliance.
As a preliminary matter, each health care organization is unique and
should carefully examine its legal compliance requirements. A compliance
program should address the myriad of federal and state statutes and
regulations that apply to the organization, including, but not limited to (1)
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health care fraud and abuse laws (for example, anti-kickback, physician
self-referral and false claims laws), (2) conflicts of interest and business
ethics laws, (3) privacy laws and regulations (including Heath Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and other state privacy laws),
and (4) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.68 For instance, compliance with SOA and
other federal statutes requires an understanding of complex civil and
criminal penalty schemes.
According to the OIG Guidance, there are seven essential elements to an
effective compliance program for any health care organization and these
seven elements are modeled on the seven steps of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.69 At a minimum, all compliance programs aimed at reducing
health care fraud and abuse should include the following seven elements:
1.

The development and distribution of written standards of
conduct, as well as written policies and procedures that
promote the hospital’s commitment to compliance (e.g.,
by including adherence to compliance as an element in
evaluating managers and employees) that address specific
areas of potential fraud, such as claims development and
submission processes, code naming, and financial
relationships with physicians and other health care
professionals;

2.

The designation of a chief compliance officer and other
appropriate bodies, for example, a corporate-compliance
committee charged with the responsibility of operating
and monitoring the compliance program, who report
directly to the CEO and the governing body;

3.

The development and implementation of regular, effective
education and training programs for all affected
employees;

4.

The maintenance of a process, such as a hotline, to
receive complaints, and the adoption of procedures to
protect the anonymity of complainants and to protect
whistleblowers from retaliation;
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5.

The development of a system to respond to the allegations
of improper/illegal activities and the enforcement of
appropriate disciplinary action against employees who
have violated internal compliance policies, applicable
statutes, regulations or federal health care program
requirements;

6.

The use of audits and/or other evaluation techniques to
monitor compliance and assist in the reduction of
identified problem areas; and

7.

The investigation and remediation of identified systemic
problems and the development of policies addressing the
non-employment or retention of sanctioned individuals.70

The OIG Guidance expanded the seven elements into a more detailed
overview of corporate responsibility and guidance on structuring a
compliance program. In addition to an overview of a board’s duty to
implement and oversee compliance, the OIG Guidance provides directors
with a list of eighteen questions that they can ask their organization’s
management team to better educate themselves regarding their
organization’s compliance efforts and help protect themselves from
unnecessary exposure to liability.71
1. Structural Implementation
A board of directors should determine the key employees responsible for
the implementation of the compliance program because the success of the
program relies upon assigning high-level personnel to oversee the
implementation and operations.72 When management is decentralized, as
was the case in Caremark, it is important to assign key employees across
levels of management to oversee compliance. For example, adopting
policies and procedures for local branch managers to certify compliance is a
good way to avoid problems associated with decentralized management. A
board may want to establish a committee to monitor compliance program
operations and regularly report to the board.73 An organization must have a
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compliance reporting system whereby the board receives reports on a
regular basis.74
A solid understanding of the rationale and objectives of the compliance
program, as well as its goals and inherent limitations is essential if the board
is to evaluate the reasonableness of its design and effectiveness of its
operations.75 The board needs to be realistic about its goals and
limitations.76 Compliance programs will not prevent all wrongful conduct;
however, the board can be satisfied that mechanisms are in place to ensure
the timely reporting of suspected violations and to evaluate and implement
remedial measures.77 For instance, the Caremark board took several steps
to assure compliance with company policies concerning alleged violations
of federal and state statutes.78
The compliance program should address the significant risks of the
organization.79 A comprehensive and ongoing process of compliance risk
assessment is important to the board’s awareness of new challenges to the
organization. Compliance risk assessment is also important for the board’s
evaluation of management priorities and program resource allocation.80
From the beginning, the board must address the resources necessary to
implement and to carry out the compliance program.81 The investment can
be significant and requires a long-term commitment of resources for
continuous oversight and improvement of the program.82 The investment
may include annual budgetary commitments and human resources dedicated
to compliance.83
2. Operational Compliance
A code of conduct is fundamental to a successful compliance program
because it articulates the organization’s commitment to ethical behavior.84
The code should detail the fundamental principles, values, and framework
for action within the organization.85
The code helps define the
organization’s culture and its commitment to unearthing potential illegal
conduct within the organization.86 Codes are beneficial only if they are
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meaningfully communicated throughout the organization and enforced.87
The organization should have zero tolerance for non-compliance with the
code of conduct. In addition, the organization should implement policies
and procedures to address compliance risk areas and establish internal
controls to counter vulnerabilities.88 Because health care laws and
regulations often change, an organization’s policies and procedures need
periodic review and revision if appropriate.89 Regular communication with
counsel can assist the board in its oversight responsibilities in the changing
regulatory environment.90
The organization must assign a compliance officer who has the autonomy
and sufficient resources to perform assessments and respond appropriately
to misconduct.91 The compliance officer should be sufficiently neutral from
the board and upper management to make independent decisions concerning
the oversight of the compliance program. The compliance officer must
have the authority to review all documents and other information that is
relevant to compliance activities.92 Boards should maintain open lines of
communication and reporting within management and between the board,
compliance officers, and consultants in order to ensure timely and candid
reports for those responsible for the compliance program.93 For example, in
McCall, the complaint alleged that the board was knowledgeable of senior
management’s efforts to devise schemes to improperly increase revenues
and profits and to perpetuate a management philosophy that provided strong
incentives for employees to commit fraud.94 A neutral and autonomous
compliance officer could have responded to the misconduct and addressed
the situation in a candid manner.
The compliance officer must have adequate financial resources and
personnel to implement all aspects of the compliance program.
Compliance-related responsibilities should be assigned across all
appropriate levels of the organization, and employees need to be held
accountable for meeting compliance-related objectives during performance
reviews.95 This will ensure that there is accountability for proper
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implementation or oversight of the compliance program. Where there is
poor distribution of responsibility and authority for accountability beyond
the compliance officer, implementation may lag.96 All employees need to
be held accountable for compliance, and this can be enhanced by creating
incentives—both positive and negative—for complying with the
organization’s policies and procedures.
3. Preventing and Responding to Violations
One of the most important elements of an effective compliance program
is organization-wide training on compliance standards and procedures,
including remedial training as needed.97 Specifically, there should be
training on identified risk areas particular to the organization, as well as an
educational program to assess those risks.98
The oversight of the compliance program occurs in the context of
significant regulatory and industry developments that impact the
organization not only as a health care organization but also more broadly as
a corporate entity.99 Therefore, the board must be kept apprised of
significant regulatory and industry developments and must structure the
compliance program to address those changing risks.100
The compliance program should be monitored and audited periodically to
evaluate its effectiveness.101 Monitoring may provide early identification of
program or operational weaknesses and could substantially reduce exposure
to government or whistleblower claims.102 One effective method for
monitoring is the performance of regular, periodic compliance audits by
internal or external auditors.103 Under the SOA, for instance, employers are
required to establish audit committees and to adopt procedures for the
confidential and anonymous reporting of questionable accounting or
auditing practices.104
In addition to evaluating the organization’s
conformity with specific regulatory rules or the legality of business
arrangements, an effective compliance program periodically reviews
whether program elements have been satisfied.
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The organization must respond appropriately to deficiencies or suspected
non-compliance.105 Failure to abide by the compliance program, violation
of laws, and other types of misconduct can threaten the organization’s status
as a reliable and trustworthy provider of health care.106 In addition, failure
to respond to a known deficiency or suspected violation may be considered
an aggravating factor in evaluating the organization’s potential liability for
the underlying problem.107 In McCall, several “red flags” such as audit
discrepancies, a whistleblower action, and an extensive criminal
investigation indicated that the board was, or should have been, aware of
the fraud.108 Similarly in Abbott, the board of directors knew about a sixyear history of non-compliance and took no corrective action.109
The board’s duty of care requires that it explore whether procedures are
in place to respond to allegations of misconduct and whether management
promptly initiated corrective measures.110 Many organizations will take
disciplinary action when employee conduct violates the organization’s code
of conduct and policies.111 Any disciplinary measures should be enforced
uniformly.112 The organization also must have policies in place that address
the appropriate protection of whistleblowers and those accused of
misconduct.113 In order for a compliance program to work, employees must
be able to ask questions and to report problems.114 In fulfilling its duty of
care, the board should have a process in place to encourage such
constructive communication.115
Legal risk may exist not only based on conduct under scrutiny, but also
on actions taken by the organization in response to an investigation. In
addition to potential obstruction of a government investigation, the
organization may face charges by employees for unlawful retaliation or
violation of employee rights. For such responses, the board should confirm
that processes and policies have been developed in consultation with legal
counsel and are well communicated and understood across all levels of the
organization.
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The board should fully understand management’s process for evaluating
and responding to identified violations of the organization’s policies, as
well as violations of federal or state laws.116 In addition, the board should
receive sufficient information to evaluate the appropriateness of the
organization’s response.117 Boards should have policies governing when to
report probable violations to government authorities.118 Federal law
encourages organizations to self disclose wrongdoing, but boards should
work with legal counsel to develop a policy on when and whether to make
those disclosures.119
4. Compliance and Reporting Tailored to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
To avoid prosecution under the SOA, an employer should adopt a
protocol by which employees may report workplace violations of
accounting and securities laws. As a preliminary matter, employers should
train all employees, particularly managers and supervisors, about the SOA’s
provisions. Employers should communicate to employees that the company
has a “zero tolerance” policy regarding violations of securities and other
laws. The zero tolerance policy must be embraced not only by the upper
management, but also by supervisory and non-supervisory employees.
Employers should also consider adopting and implementing policies that
encourage reporting and that discourage retaliation in response to employee
reporting. To be effective, such policies should include the following
information:
•

What constitutes material violations, adapting language
from 18 U.S.C. sections 1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348;

•

How to report and to whom to report (with several
alternatives);

•

How the report will be investigated; and,

•

How violations will be addressed.
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It is imperative that an employer’s reporting policy contain provisions for
confidential or anonymous reporting. The policy should state the
employer’s intention to keep reports of violations confidential (subject to
such disclosure as may be required to investigate the complaint), remedy
any violative behavior, and/or to respond to governmental agency inquiries.
Employers should take efforts to distribute a copy of the policy to all
employees on a periodic basis. The policy should also be posted in
prominent locations around the office and should be given to the
independent auditing committee. The prohibition against retaliation should
be included in bolder print. After distributing the policy, the employer
should have all of its employees sign a receipt or acknowledgment form.
This form should be maintained in their personnel file, along with
employment manuals and non-competition agreements.
It is also important that numerous persons, not only employee
supervisors, receive reports of violations. Employers are advised to treat
complaints seriously, investigate the allegations thoroughly with trained
investigators, and then take appropriate actions designed to end any
violations. Those responsible for investigating reported violations should
commence investigation promptly and aggressively.
Employers should establish a procedure for documenting investigations.
Information that should be documented includes the identities of
interviewed witnesses and witnesses who were not interviewed or who
refused to be interviewed. The investigator should write a summary of each
witness’s testimony and should keep a log of reviewed documents. In
addition, the investigator should prepare a succinct written conclusion of the
investigation and record any remedial steps taken. Finally, employers
should hold supervisors and employees accountable for any inappropriate
behavior that actually or potentially constitutes harassment or retaliation.
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5. Additional Considerations Regarding Corporate Compliance
Enhanced corporate governance and compliance do more than mitigate
risk and reduce fraud and abuse. Compliance programs foster a sense of
trust in investors and in the public. An effective compliance program
outlines policies and procedures for recognizing and reducing risk of health
care fraud and abuse, which in turn, increases trust and confidence on all
levels of the organization among employees, staff, and directors. A
compliance program also reduces the likelihood of a qui tam lawsuit
because employees are more likely to report violations within the
organization when they know policies exist to protect them against
retaliation.
The OIG Guidance is a good starting place for developing organizational
compliance, but it does not go far enough in pointing out the real risks of
non-compliance examined in Caremark and its progeny. The OIG
Guidance does not detail the real and personal financial risk that directors
face for compliance violations. For example, the OIG Guidance suggests
that directors face liability only in “extraordinary circumstances”; however,
case law, such as that found in McCall and Abbott, suggests that something
less than extreme circumstances may expose directors to personal liability.
While the government may not pursue directors except under extraordinary
circumstances, shareholder derivative suits and whistleblower suits expose
directors to increased scrutiny in monitoring the affairs of the corporation.
Compliance violations have numerous consequences. The government
has devoted substantial resources to ferreting out health care fraud and
abuse. Penalties for failure to oversee a proper compliance program
include, but are not limited to, treble damages, civil monetary penalties of
$11,000 per false claim, exclusion from federal and state health care
programs, and personal liability for directors. Private whistleblowers play
an active role in identifying fraudulent practices within a health care
organization and are also eligible for a potentially large pay-off. An
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organization may receive significantly reduced sanctions upon conviction of
criminal wrongdoing if it has adopted an effective compliance program.
Consequences of non-compliance extend beyond the individual health
care organization and board of directors. Taxpayers bear the burden of
funding the increased budget needed for government prosecutorial action.
Penalizing an organization by excluding them from federal and state health
care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid hurts both the organization
and Medicare and Medicaid recipients. Exclusion from programs like
Medicare and Medicaid is a harsh penalty for health care organizations that
derive a significant amount of reimbursement from these programs.
Exclusion also affects Medicare and Medicaid patients by limiting access to
health care at these organizations. Non-compliance also encourages
whistleblower actions because they come with a potentially large payoff for
the individual who reports misconduct to the government. Encouraging
health care organizations to identify and prevent fraud and abuse benefits
the organization, itself, as well as members of society.

III. CONCLUSION
The health care industry operates in a heavily regulated environment with
multiple high-risk areas. Health care organizations and boards of directors
face unique challenges, especially in light of the government’s increased
oversight and focus on health care fraud, waste, and abuse. Caremark and
its progeny, as well as the recent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
increase the level of detail directors must pay to corporate compliance and
oversight in carrying out their duties. Failure to comply with federal and
state statutes and regulations can be devastating for a health care
organization facing the resulting penalties. In addition to criminal and civil
monetary penalties, health care providers that have defrauded federal health
care programs may be excluded from participation in federal and statesponsored health care programs. Exclusion from health care programs is
damaging to organizations because of vital role such programs play in
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funding health care. The crippling effects of financial penalties and
exclusion from federal programs have been the death knell for health care
organizations. The focus on “corporate responsibility” via federal and state
statutes and judicial law places additional pressure on health care
organizations to implement and carry out effective corporate-compliance
programs. The “good old days” of sitting around the boardroom smoking
cigars and talking politics are gone. Instead of being filled with cigar
smoke, today’s boardroom is filled with the ever present need for board
diligence regarding the organization’s operations—with thoughtful
consideration about significant decisions affecting the organization—and
with enhanced candor encouraging all board members to engage in open
discussion and to bring prospective issues to light in a timely manner.
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and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating
to fraud against shareholders, when the information or assistance is
provided to or the investigation is conducted by—
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of
Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the
employee (or such other person working for the employer
who has the authority to investigate, discover, or
terminate misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist
in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the
employer) relating to an alleged violation of Sections 1341, 1343,
1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud
against shareholders.
(b) Enforcement Action.—
(1) In General.—A person who alleges discharge or other
discrimination by any person in violation of subsection (a) may seek
relief under subsection (c), by—
(A) filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor; or
(B) if the Secretary has not issued a final decision within
180 days of the filing of the complaint and there is no
showing that such delay is due to the bad faith of the
claimant, bringing an action at law or equity for de novo
review in the appropriate district court of the United
States, which shall have jurisdiction over such an action
without regard to the amount in controversy.
(2) Procedure.—
(A) In General.—An action under paragraph (1)(A) shall
be governed under the rules and procedures set forth in
Section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.
(B) Exception.—Notification made under Section
42121(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, shall be made
to the person named in the complaint and to the
employer.
(C) Burdens of Proof.—An action brought under
paragraph (1)(B) shall be governed by the legal burdens
of proof set forth in Section 42121(b) of title 49, United
States Code.
(D) Statute of Limitations.—An action under paragraph
(1) shall be commenced not later than 90 days after the
date on which the violation occurs.
(c) Remedies.—
(1) In General.—An employee prevailing in any action under
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subsection (b)(1) shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the
employee whole.
(2) Compensatory Damages.—Relief for any action under paragraph
(1) shall include—
(A) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the
employee would have had, but for the discrimination;
(B) the amount of back pay, with interest; and
(C) compensation for any special damages sustained as a
result of the discrimination, including litigation costs,
expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees.
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•
•
•
•

Billing for discharge in lieu of transfer;
Patient’s freedom of choice;
Credit balances—failure to refund;
Hospital incentives that violate the anti-kickback statute or other similar
federal or state statute or regulation;
•
Joint ventures;
•
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•
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•
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health maintenance organization; and,
•
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